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Abstract: Th is study shows that an important number of late medieval, Re-
naissance and early modern authors postulated the same teleological principle 
in order to argue both for and against the existence of the vacuum. Th at pos-
tulate, which I call the “principle of subordination,” holds that in order to 
preserve the good of nature, the particular and specifi c natures must be sub-
ordinated to the common and universal nature. In other words, in order to 
preserve nature as a whole, the individual tendencies of bodies must be subor-
dinated to the general tendency of nature. Th roughout the wide range of cases 
addressed in this study, a continuity is observed in the rationales underlying 
the discussions about the existence of the vacuum. All of them, tacitly or not, 
ascribed to nature the teleological principle of subordination, mostly by inter-
preting traditional experimental instances. Although this continuity is clearly 
recognizable, variations in nuances and details are also present, owing to the 
various contexts within which each response to the question of the existence 
of a vacuum emerged.
Keywords: void and self-preservation of the whole, particular nature and uni-
versal nature, experiments on the void, late medieval natural philosophy, late 
scholasticism, Renaissance natural philosophy, early modern natural philosophy.
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1. Introduction
A review of the long history of vacuist and anti-vacuist positions held from 
Antiquity to the Modern Age shows that these were based on arguments of an 
empirical, a theological and a metaphysical nature.1 Th is article will draw on 
several examples of various perspectives on the vacuum held during the period 
extending from the thirteenth to the seventeenth century in order to examine 
how they all employed a particular kind of teleological argument. It will show 
that a signifi cant number of medieval, Renaissance and early modern authors 
adopted a teleological postulate that, although present in various formulations 
and across diff erent contexts, can be summarized as follows: to preserve the 
whole of nature, the specifi c and the particular must be subordinated to the 
common and the universal.2 Many authors used this postulate as a ground to 
support their anti-vacuist positions, and at times to explain empirical phe-
nomena. On the other hand, this postulate was also accepted by some vacuist 
authors, who did not see it as a suffi  cient reason to reject the possibility of the 
existence of the void. Furthermore, the postulate had applications in various 
fi elds, beyond the discussions about the existence of the vacuum, such as biol-
ogy, ethics and politics. 
2. Th e Principle of Subordination in Medieval Sources
Th e sources that set the agenda for the medieval discussions on the vacuum 
were chiefl y the central chapters of Book IV of Aristotle’s Physics and, to a 
lesser extent, Book I, Chapter 9 of his De Caelo. To these were added ancient 
Greek and Arabic texts, recovered late in the Middle Ages, which introduced a 
new series of experiments, on the basis of which one could argue both for and 
against the existence of a vacuum.3 Starting from these sources, the medieval 
commentaries on the Physics and De Caelo combined Aristotelian theory with 
empirical observation (while primarily relying on thought experiments). Th e 
usual medieval practice was to adopt Aristotle’s position on the void, which 
barely took into account the empirical data. From there, commentators would 
1 Th e essential reference work for a study on vacuum theories from the Middle Ages to the 
seventeenth century,  one which informs my own work, is Edward Grant, Much Ado about Noth-
ing. Th eories of Space and Vacuum from the Middle Ages to the Scientifi c Revolution, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981. See also Charles Schmitt, “Experimental Evidence for and 
against the Void: Th e Sixteenth-Century Arguments,” Isis 58 (1967), pp. 355-357; Cornelius 
De Waard, L’expérience barométrique. Ses antécédents et ses explications, Th ouars: Gamon, 1936.
2 For the sake of brevity, I will henceforth refer to this postulate as “the principle of sub-
ordination.” 
3 Among these texts, Heron of Alexandria’s Liber Spiritualium, the anonymous Tractatus 
de inani et vacuo and Philo of Byzantium’s Liber de ingeniis spiritualibus. See Grant, Much Ado 
about Nothing, pp. 67-68, 81, 97-98.  
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search through the experiments known from Arabic and Greek sources for 
empirical evidence to justify their theoretical stand.
In the medieval period, it was common to speak of three kinds of vacuum 
known under diff erent names: the interstitial vacuum—located within intra-
cosmic bodies; the separate vacuum—located between intra-cosmic bodies; 
and the extra-cosmic vacuum—located beyond the universe. Concerning the 
existence of the latter, the medieval views were divided, giving rise to long 
expositions. Some authors admitted the possible existence of the extra-cosmic 
vacuum in what used to be called “imaginary space.” By contrast, all but one 
of them denied the existence of the intra-cosmic vacuum, both of the intersti-
tial and of the separate variety.4 Th e arguments the medieval authors advanced 
for rejecting in principle the existence of the interstitial or separate vacuum 
were inspired by the arguments Aristotle had presented in the Physics. Broadly 
speaking, we can say that Aristotle refuted the intra-cosmic void by three 
arguments: 1) the existence of the vacuum is absurd because it implies the 
penetrability of matter; 2) the existence of the vacuum is superfl uous because 
there is no basis on which to diff erentiate the void from the dimensions oc-
cupied by a body; and 3) the existence of the vacuum is impossible because 
it would prevent motion. Yet not only did the medieval authors extend the 
Aristotelian arguments—and especially the one dealing with the eff ects of the 
vacuum on motion—but they also added new elements to rebut vacuism. 
Among these was the idea that “nature abhors a vacuum,” whose precise origin 
has yet to be established.5
Th e pioneering studies of Pierre Duhem have revealed that, in the medi-
eval period, the idea that nature abhors a vacuum was frequently supported 
by the principle of subordination. Duhem presented Roger Bacon (1214/20-
1294) as the fi rst exponent of this anti-vacuist argument.6 In several of his 
works, R. Bacon develops extensive arguments that serve to deny in various 
ways the existence of a vacuum.7 Some of these arguments start from a series 
of experiments. We will take as our reference the case of the clepsydra, one 
of the most discussed experiments in the debates about the existence of a 
vacuum. Th e term “clepsydra” designated a range of various containers used 
to hold liquids. What they all had in common was a top opening that could 
be sealed hermetically—usually so small in diameter that it could be stopped 
4 According to the secondary literature, the one exception is Nicholas of Autrecourt, who 
accepted the existence of the interstitial vacuum. See Grant, Much Ado about Nothing, pp. 74-77.
5 Edward Grant, “Medieval Explanations and Interpretations of the Dictum Nature Abhors 
a Vacuum,” Traditio 29 (1973), pp. 327-338.
6 Pierre Duhem, Le Système du Monde, 10 vols., Paris: Hermann, 1913-1959, vol. VIII, 
pp. 134-148.
7 See, for example, Roger Bacon, Liber primus communium naturalium, partes tertia et quar-
ta, in Opera hactenus inedita Rogeri Baconi, ed. by Robert Steele, vol. III, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1911, pars tertia, distinctio secunda, cap. 4-6.   
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with a fi nger—and a lower surface perforated with one or more tiny holes.8 
When the vessel had water in it and its upper opening was stopped, the liquid 
would not fl ow out through the holes in the bottom. If, however, the upper 
opening was unstopped, the water would fl ow down through the holes. To 
R. Bacon, this experiment was an empirical proof for the impossibility of a 
vacuum, for, normally, the space from which water had fl own out would be 
fi lled by air entering through the upper opening, and, contrariwise, when the 
upper opening was covered and the air prevented from fl owing in, the liquid 
would not fl ow out. 
R. Bacon claims that diff erent situations could arise in the case of the 
stopped clepsydra: a) that the water fl ows out and a vacuum occurs; b) that 
the water fl ows out and the walls of the clepsydra collapse and meet to prevent 
a vacuum; c) that the water is suspended and the vacuum avoided. Faced with 
these options, nature, which always tends towards that which better agrees 
with it, follows the course that involves less disorder.  Th e most damaging 
course is a) because it goes against the conservation of material continuity.9 
Th is option discarded, R. Bacon argues that it is better for nature if c) occurs, 
and not b). For c) (that is, water being suspended) is only an accident rela-
tive to the nature of water, whereas b) (the walls of the clepsydra collapsing 
in order to meet) is not merely accidental, but contrary to the very essence of 
the container.10
Th e clepsydra experiment, along with similar others, showed that, in order 
to avoid a vacuum, nature does not always follow its regular course, since the 
natural tendency would be for water to move downwards. R. Bacon identi-
fi es a series of effi  cient causes that contribute to avoiding the vacuum—in the 
case of the clepsydra, the air, which, because of its fl uidity, tries to enter the 
vessel through the bottom holes and holds up the water, the sealed opening, 
etc.—and adds that they are all governed by a fi nal cause: “the order of the 
bodies of the universe and the congruence of the machine of the world.”11 Th is 
fi nal cause is identifi ed with the universal nature that aff ects all things and 
seeks material continuity. Th e particular nature of water tends only towards 
8 Duhem, Système du Monde, vol. VIII, pp. 135-136. Cf. Max Jammer, Concepts of Space. 
Th e History of Th eories of Space in Physics, third enlarged edition, New York: Dover, 1993, pp. 
91-92. Albertus Magnus describes the clepsydra and its operation in Physica, lib. IV, tract. II, 
cap. 1, in Opera Omnia, curavit Institutum Alberti Magni Coloniensi Wilhelmo Kübel Prae-
side, Monasterii Westfalorum: Aschendorff , 1987, tomus IV, pars 1, p. 231.
9 It should be said that this explanation is problematic. One might argue that the negation 
of the solution of material continuity is precisely equivalent with the negation of the existence of 
a vacuum, in which case R. Bacon’s argument is circular. I owe this observation to D. Di Liscia.
10 R. Bacon, Quaestiones supra libros quatuor physicorum Aristotelis, in Opera hactenus inedita 
Rogeri Baconi, ed. by F.M. Delorme, vol. VIII, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1927, pp. 199-201; 
id., Quaestiones supra libros octo physicorum Aristotelis, in Opera hactenus inedita Rogeri Baconi, 
ed. F.M. Delorme, vol. XIII, Oxford Clarendon Press, 1935, pp. 229-230.
11 R. Bacon, Quaestiones supra libros quatuor physicorum Aristotelis, p. 201.
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that which is the end of water considered on its own, and not as part of the 
universe. But since water is not only a substance with its own ends, but also 
part of the universe, its particular nature obeys the universal nature, which is 
more powerful and rules over it. 
R. Bacon defi nes the universal nature as “the governing force of the universe,” 
which is diff used among the substances of the heavens and throughout all the 
bodies in the world. All bodies agree in this universal nature and are maintained 
at a certain general level of perfection and well being. R. Bacon refers to Avi-
cenna12 in presenting it and applies it not only to the vacuum, but also to other 
examples from nature pertaining to biology.13 At least two other contemporary 
authors used the principle of subordination, again in contexts unrelated to the 
problem of the vacuum: Albertus Magnus (1200-1280) and Th omas Aquinas 
(1224-1274). Th is suggests that the distinction between the universal and the 
particular natures, understood as a relation of teleological subordination, was 
part of a philosophical discourse widely shared at the time.14 
In his commentaries on the Physics, Albertus Magnus examines the mean-
ing of this distinction, but he does so outside an anti-vacuist context.15 Th e 
topic is addressed in book 2, when he discusses the meaning of the terms “na-
ture” and “natural” proposed by Aristotle.16 In a special digression, Albertus 
distinguishes two senses in which one can understand the diff erence between 
12 R. Bacon, Liber primus communium naturalium, partes prima et secunda, in Opera hacte-
nus inedita Rogeri Baconi, ed. by Robert Steele, vol. II, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1909, pars se-
cunda, pp. 92-94. Cf. Avicenna, Methaphysica siue eius prima philosophia, Venetiis: Bernardinus 
Venetus, de Vitalibus, per Hieronymum de Durantibus., 1495, lib. VI, cap. 5, sine numero: 
“Intelligo autem per naturam particularem virtutem propriam regis unius individui, et intelligo per 
naturam universalem virtutem infusam in substantias celorum, quasi unam rem et gubernantem 
universitatem generationum.”
13 It should be added that R. Bacon maintains that universal nature is prior to individual 
nature (which in its turn is divisible into particular nature governing the species and particu-
lar nature governing the individual) only as concerns “the work and execution of nature.” By 
contrast, as concerns “intent,” the particular nature has priority. See R. Bacon, Liber primus 
communium naturalium, partes prima et secunda, pars secunda, p. 94. Th ese diff erent types of 
priority mentioned by Bacon have to do with the medieval discussions of the problem of uni-
versals, a topic that is beyond the scope of this paper. For more on this, see Jeremiah Hackett, 
“Roger Bacon,” in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Th e Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2012 
Edition), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/roger-bacon/. 
14 Grant, “Medieval Explanations,” p. 330, n. 6, deems it probable that the source of this 
distinction between universal and particular natures was the anonymous Liber de Causis (dis-
covered and translated from Arabic into Latin in the twelfth century). Cf. Grant, Much Ado 
about Nothing, pp. 69-70.
15 Duhem, Système du Monde, vol. VIII, p. 146, mentions Albertus Magnus’ anti-vacuist 
position and sets it in contrast with that of R. Bacon, in that it does not use the principle of 
subordination. What Duhem does not tell us is that Albertus does apply this principle in biol-
ogy, as we shall see. 
16 Cf. Aristotle, Physica, II, 1, 192b8-193b21.
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the universal and particular natures and on the basis of which the expressions 
secundum cursum naturae universalis and secundum cursum naturae particularis 
are to be interpreted. On the one hand, the universal nature can be under-
stood in a relative sense, as that by which the genus diff ers from the species. 
Th us, the nature of the animal, as a genus, is the universal nature. On the 
other hand, there are two ways in which the universal nature can be under-
stood in absolute terms. Th e fi rst defi nes the universal nature as the principle 
of motion and rest on which all things depend, which for this very reason are 
considered natural. A second absolute reading of “universal nature” states that 
the universal nature contains and governs all the particular natures.17
Albertus gives further details on the dynamics and characteristics of this 
duality of natures. Th e universal nature consists in the distribution of the 
power of the celestial motions to the particular natures, manifesting itself in 
a unique way in each one of them:  “If one were to compare the celestial mo-
tions with the things below, then they are like a power that moves and governs 
the things below. But if we compare the lower natures to the higher ones, then 
this power is multiplied according to the diversity of the things it governs.”18 
Th is association of the lower and the higher, of the earthly and the heavenly, 
is part of one of the traditional interpretations of Aristotelianism, primarily 
based on the exegesis of Aristotle’s Metereology.19
By way of illustration, Albertus off ers two examples from Aristotle’s bio-
logical works,20 typifying the relation between the universal and particular 
natures, taken in their absolute sense. One example is that of the corruption 
of natural beings. Th e particular nature does not pursue corruption as its end, 
so death lies outside its course (praeter cursum naturae particularis).21 None-
theless, things do perish, because of the universal nature, which sets a term 
to life through successive cycles of generations and corruptions. In the same 
way, the second example tells us, the generation of the female is not sought 
by the particular nature, as that nature seeks perfection, which is the male. In 
fact, females are born due to some defi ciency in the effi  cient causes or in the 
natural agents involved in the generation. But since the existence of females is 
necessary to assist the males in procreation and allow for the perpetuation of 
the species, the universal nature prevails over the particular nature and dictates 
that on occasion females be born. 
17 Albertus Magnus, Physica, lib. II, tract. I, cap. 5, in Opera Omnia, tomus IV, pars 1, pp. 
83-84.
18 Ibid., p. 83. 
19 Ibid., lib. I, tract. I, cap. 6, p. 13. Aristotle, Meteorologica, I, 2, 339a.
20 Aristotle, De generatione animalium, II, 3, 737a.
21 It should be mentioned that Roger Bacon presents a similar argument and attributes it 
to Avicenna. See Opus majus, edited with an introduction and analytical table by J. H. Bridges, 
vol. II, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1897, pars I, cap. VI, p. 454. 
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As mentioned above, another author who adopted the principle of subor-
dination was Th omas Aquinas, in his case in order to discuss “natural love.” In 
an argument designed to defend the thesis that man in his pure state, by the 
nature God bestowed on him, loves God more than he loves himself, Th omas 
starts from the premise that, in its natural state, the part cares more for the good 
of the whole than for its own.22 Natural love (dilectio naturalis) is an inclination 
imparted to nature by God; hence nothing natural can be perverse. Th e primacy 
of the common good over the private good is natural not only in man, but in 
the whole of creation, yet is called “natural love” in the strict sense only when it 
comes to creatures endowed with intellect (angels and men). Th is inclination is 
seen more clearly in non-rational beings, for their pursuing the common good 
over their individual good entails that they are made to act this way without any 
deliberation, by virtue of natural necessity. Th is hierarchy of goods is at play in 
many diff erent realms: politics, human nature, brute animals and plants.
We see that every natural part operates with a certain inclination towards the 
good of the whole, even to its own danger or detriment. As is clear when some-
one exposes his hand to a sword to defend his head, on which the health of the 
entire body depends. Th us it is natural for each part in its way to love the whole 
more than itself. So, according to this natural inclination and to the political vir-
tue, the good citizen exposes himself to moral danger in the pursuit of the com-
mon good. But it is clear that God is the common good of the whole universe 
and of all of its parts. So every creature loves God more than itself naturally and 
each in its own way: the insensible things naturally, the brute animals sensitively 
and the rational creatures through an intellectual love called dilectio.23  
Th omas adds an interesting distinction about the natural inclinations of 
things. Th ere are two types of natural inclinations: to motion and to action. 
In the fi rst case, nature curves back on itself. For example, fi re moves upwards 
for its own conservation. By contrast, nature’s inclination to action seeks the 
common good, i.e., the conservation of the species to which the thing be-
longs. Th us, fi re does not act to generate more fi re for its own sake as an indi-
vidual, but for the sake of what is generated, which is its form. And further, it 
does so for the common good that is the conservation of the species.24  
Th e theories of R. Bacon, Albertus Magnus and Th omas Aquinas clearly 
agree as far as the principle of subordination of the particular to the universal 
is concerned. All three of them are teleological insofar as they hold that the 
relation between the universal and the particular, between the whole and its 
22 Th omas Aquinas, Summa Th eologiae, cura et studio Petri Caramello, cum textu et recen-
siones leonina, Pars Prima et Secundae, Torino: Marietti, 1952, I, q. 60, art. 5, pp. 293-294. 
23 Th omas Aquinas, Quodlibet. I, q. 4, art. 3, p. 9, in Quaestiones Quodlibetales, cura et 
studio Fr. Raymundi Spiazzi, Editio IX, Torno: Marietti, 1956. See the application of this 
principle in Summa Th eologiae I, q. 60, art. 5.
24 Th omas Aquinas, Quodlibet. I, q. 4 art. 3, p. 10.
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parts, always has the ultimate purpose of preserving the whole. But beyond 
the shared principle and their teleological character, every theory has its own 
distinctive features. Th at of R. Bacon applies directly to the discussions about 
the vacuum, relying on experiments, although it transcends the fi eld of phys-
ics and has applications in biology as well. In the case of Albertus, the idea of 
a distinction between natures is part of the general metaphysical speculation 
about nature, clearly applying to biology, while in the case of Th omas, this 
distinction seems to have its origins in ethics and be extended to other fi elds. 
Th ese three basic fi elds of application (the problem of the vacuum, biology 
and practical philosophy) reappear in other authors that we will examine next, 
both in the medieval period and in later centuries. 
Th e anonymous author of Summa Philosophiae—a work wrongly attrib-
uted to Robert Grosseteste25—lays out the distinction between natures by em-
phasizing an element we have already encountered in Albertus Magnus and 
which will become very common in later developments, namely the idea that 
the universal nature originates from heaven and spreads to the inferior beings. 
Besides, it is maintained that the divine blessing concurs with the universal 
nature in order to govern and improve the world. Precisely therein lies the 
purpose of the subordination of the particular to the universal:
Nature, insofar as it is the same with active power and form, [...] is universal or 
particular. [...] Th is universality [...] concerns the whole either of the corporeal 
and mixed universe, or only of the corporeal universe with its own accidents. 
In the fi rst sense, the uncreated power is a universal nature, in that it univer-
sally is the primary cause of all powers and things, and the celestial sphere 
under it, receiving the infl uences of its power more abundantly and directly, 
illuminates and perfects the inferior spheres. In the second and third sense, the 
universal nature is the force instilled in the celestial substance, namely in the 
created intelligence that, with the blessing of the Creator, governs and moder-
ates all the corporeal and inferior nature […].26
Th e existence of this universal nature is required by the “order of reason,” 
which refers to an indivisible one throughout the whole series of operations. 
Since if one alone suffi  ces, it is better to postulate one rather than two. Th e 
Neoplatonic tone of this interpretation is confi rmed by the author himself, 
who associates the universal nature with Plato’s anima mundi. Th e relation be-
tween the whole and the parts is clearly stated: “All things conspire equally in 
this way with the universal nature, in which they are rooted and from which they 
25 Duhem, Système du Monde, vol. VIII, p. 148.
26 Pseudo-Grosseteste, Summa Philosophiae, trac. XVI, cap. 2, p. 590, in Ludwig Baur, Die 
philosophischen Werke des Robert Grosseteste, Bischofs von Lincoln, vol. 9 of Beiträge zur Geschichte 
der Philosophie des Mittelalters, Münster: Aschendorff , 1912, pp. 275-643.
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receive their propriety to act, so much so that their similar natures [connaturae] 
and their particular properties sometimes suspend their own eff ects and actions.”27
Furthermore, the author notes that the distinction between the universal 
and the particular is always relative, as is the distinction between genus and 
species. Th us, we may say that in a sense the particular nature is universal. 
Likewise, one can say of any species that it is particular relative to its genus 
but universal relative to its individuals. 
Th e particular nature is the force and operative property that comes with the 
species, although its eff ect is not always found in all individuals. […] So the 
fi re through its particular nature tends to move upwards and to be warm. 
However, it may sometimes move downwards and lack warmth.28 
How is this relation of subordination satisfi ed in practice? Th e univer-
sal nature either belongs to something uniquely determined, or is diff used 
through all the operations of the particular nature. Motion has the universal 
nature as its fi rst universal cause, without which the particular nature would 
not move. But it is also common for it to operate in various ways in opposi-
tion to the particular nature. When it comes to giving concrete examples of 
this relation, the author of the Summa Philosophiae does not refer us to the 
problem of the vacuum,29 but to the motion of projectiles. He holds, with 
Aristotle, that between two contrary motions there must be an interval of rest. 
Th us, when a heavy body is thrown upwards, it moves up until it ends its as-
cent and then remains an instant at rest, after which it begins its descent. Now, 
both the ascent and the temporary rest are contrary to the particular nature of 
the heavy body. Th e anonymous author claims to be following Aristotle30 in 
maintaining that the projectile is carried up to its resting point by the air that 
has been violently moved and that naturally propels the projectile as long as the 
impetus imparted to it by the fi rst effi  cient motor of the violent motion lasts. He 
thus distinguishes the initial motion (the fi rst motor of which he deems violent) 
from the motion of the air, which is the eff ect of this fi rst motor and which, in 
its turn, sets the projectile on its upward path with a natural motion. Th is fac-
ulty to move cannot belong to the particular nature of the air, but is a “property 
imparted to the fl uid elements by the universal nature.”31 In fact, the particular 
nature always tends naturally to one of two opposites, while the universal nature 
takes into account both opposites at once. It therefore constrains the particular 
nature and makes it act against its natural tendency.32 
27 Ibid., pp. 590-591.
28 Ibid., p. 591.
29 Th e author discusses the vacuum in Summa Philosophiae, pp. 417-418.
30 Cf. Aristotle, De Caelo, III, 2, 301b; Physica, IV, 8, 215a. 
31 Pseudo-Grosseteste, Summa Philosophiae, p. 592.
32 According to Duhem, Système du Monde, vol. VIII, p. 152, John Dumbleton is the only 
author who later uses a similar line of reasoning to explain the motion of projectiles. 
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As already noted by Duhem, we also fi nd an occurrence of the principle 
of subordination in Aegidius Romanus (1247-1316). One of the vacuist doc-
trines he refutes is the one according to which the existence of a vacuum is 
necessary to explain why the earth rests at the center of the universe. Pro-
ponents of this view argue that, since every part of the void is identical to 
every other part, the earth is not attracted more in one direction than in the 
other. Th erefore, it remains stationary in the center. Aegidius refutes this view 
by showing that it is impossible for a vacuum to exert this kind of attrac-
tion. Th ere are two senses in which one could talk about the attraction of the 
vacuum. On the one hand, if we take the vacuum to be a positive nature, we 
must imagine the attraction it exerts to be fantastic indeed. In fact, it would 
be an attraction that causes no motion whatsoever. An example of this would 
be the earth staying at rest while attracted in this strange way by the vacuum. 
But there is a right way to understand the attraction of the vacuum: namely as 
an attraction for the void not to occur. Th is attraction can be observed in the 
experiment of the cupping glass. When the glass is placed against the fl esh, the 
hot air suddenly cools and contracts. When this happens, the fl esh is drawn in 
to fi ll the place formerly occupied by the air, so that a vacuum does not occur. 
Aegidius adds that, if you put a warm cloth on the cupping glass, the fl esh 
would be attracted not only to avoid a vacuum, but also by the heat.
As the eff ect, i.e., the attraction itself, is positive, so must be its cause. 
When looking for what the positive and primary cause of the attraction might 
be, Aegidius fi rst, if not very convincingly, rules out two possible causes to 
fi nally accept a third. Th e cause cannot be a mixed body (i.e., a compound of 
several elements), since the attraction can arise in pure elements as well, where 
there is no mixed body. Nor can it be postulated that the pure elements pro-
duce it themselves, because the motion of attraction can rise from anywhere 
and have any direction. But the elements themselves only move in one direc-
tion: towards their natural place, when they are separated from it. Th erefore, 
Aegidius concludes, the attraction is exerted by a celestial power, “so that we 
must imagine that the whole sphere of active and passive beings is connected 
in virtue of a celestial power.” Th is power, whose link attracts all beings, en-
sures that there is no gap or void between the bodies. To show how powerful 
this celestial attraction is, the author appeals to the magnetic force (virtus), a 
paradigm often considered when it comes to specifying the nature of an at-
traction between bodies. From this perspective, the attraction produced by 
the celestial power to connect celestial bodies is similar to the attraction the 
magnet exerts on the iron:33
Whatever the place where it is located, iron is attracted by the magnet. In the 
same way, heaven wants to unite the individual parts of the universe. Whatever 
33 John Dumbleton draws a similar comparison in the same context. Cf. Duhem, Système 
du Monde, vol. VIII, p. 162.
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the place where a division and void might arise, the attraction of the celestial 
virtue acts to prevent this from happening in it.34
Albertus de Saxonia (ca. 1316-1390), member of the school of Paris and 
pupil of Buridan, aligns himself with authors that defend a “specifi c” (particu-
lar) and a “common” (universal) nature of motions. In his commentary on 
De Caelo, when it comes to specifying the type of motion that corresponds to 
heaven as a simple body, Albert concludes that “it is impossible for the same 
simple body to move naturally with specifi cally diff erent simple motions in 
succession.”35 According to this thesis, a simple body (the four elements and 
the ether) has one and only one corresponding simple motion (rectilinear 
ascent, rectilinear descent or rotation) according to the inclination prescribed 
to it by its form. In this respect, Albertus de Saxonia subscribes to the me-
dieval tradition following Aristotle. For Aristotle, water and air have relative 
and not absolute weight, unlike fi re (absolute lightness) and earth (absolute 
heaviness). Th erefore, water and air will move up or down, depending on 
the region they fi nd themselves in when not in their natural place. For ex-
ample, water moves downwards when in the region of air, but upwards when 
in the region of earth. Whereas earth always moves downwards and fi re always 
moves upwards.36
However, Albertus de Saxonia acknowledges a possible objection to this 
thesis. For example, in a siphon from which air has been violently expelled, 
water rises to follow the extracted air. As a simple element in the region of 
air, water has a simple motion—that of descent—yet in this case it moves 
upwards. Faced with this possible objection, Albertus de Saxonia replies that 
it is possible to refute it through the following explanation:
To this we reply that the fact that a simple body moves with specifi cally dif-
ferent simple motions is to be understood in two ways. On the one hand, as 
meaning that any of those motions properly belongs to it. On the other hand, 
as meaning that one of those motions properly belongs to it, while the other 
does not, but is common both to it and to any other body. Th en we say that, 
in the fi rst sense, it is impossible for a body to have diff erent natural motions 
simpliciter. But, in the second sense, it has them. Hence the way water rises 
naturally, in order to avoid a vacuum when air is violently sucked upwards, is 
not specifi c to water, but to any body that fi nds itself in this situation and that 
34 Aegidii Romani in libros de Physico auditu Aristotelis commentaria, Venetiis: Heredis Oc-
taviani Scoti, 1502, liber IV, lect. XII, dubitatio 5ta., fol. 79 c. Cf. Duhem, Système du Monde, 
vol. VIII, p. 153-155.
35 Albertus de Saxonia, Quaestiones subtilissimae in libros de caelo et mundo, Venetiis: Octa-
viani Scoti, 1/8492, lib. 1, quaestio 1, fol. A3, col c. 
36 Ibid., fol. A2, col. b. Cf. Aristotle, De Caelo, IV,1,307b 30-35; IV, 4 -5, 311b15-313a13. 
On the Aristotelian tradition concerning weight, see Denis O’Brien, Th eories of Weight in the 
Ancient World, 2 vols., Paris–Leiden: Les Belles Lettres–Brill, 1981-1984, vol. 1, pp. 6-40.
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is similarly positioned respecting the violently moved air. Some state this solu-
tion in diff erent words, saying that a simple body only has one natural motion 
according to the species attached to its specifi c nature. Nonetheless, there is 
nothing preventing a simple body to have several specifi cally diff erent motions 
according to its species. Of these, one would be natural to it according to its 
own nature and another, natural to it according to the nature or inclination it 
shares with other bodies.37  
Th is explanation posits that the motions of a simple body stay in the realm 
of the natural and do not become violent, even when they do not correspond 
with what a body should normally do in that region: in the siphon experi-
ment, water “naturally” moves upwards because this suits the whole universe. 
Th e tension between the specifi c and common inclinations is resolved accord-
ing to the purpose of preserving continuity. 
Already by the end of the Middle Ages and on the verge of the Renaissance, 
Paulus Venetus’s (1369/72-1429) interpretation of the clepsydra experiment 
shows the infl uence of his Oxford masters. In analyzing the phenomenon 
of the clepsydra, Paulus Venetus makes use of the vocabulary of “appetites,” 
which will be very frequently employed by later authors. He explains that, 
when no air enters a clepsydra whose upper opening is sealed,
water is not prohibited from descending by something extrinsic but by some-
thing intrinsic to it. For it wants to descend according to the appetite of its 
species and it wants to unite with the body according to the appetite of its 
genus. And because genus is prior to species, the water fi rst wants to join 
the body, and then to descend. But if water descended, a void would occur 
between it and the container. Th erefore, so as not to produce a vacuum, the 
appetite of the genus prevents the descending.38 
Paulus Venetus believes that the cause of the motions aimed at preventing 
a vacuum must be intrinsic. Th e attraction that keeps the bodies from going 
to their natural places is clearly negative, because its purpose is to prevent a 
vacuum. Th is attraction can come from the species—as in the case of the mag-
net attracting iron; from heat—as in the case of the sun attracting vapors from 
above; from vacuum alone—as in the case of water moving upwards along 
with the air extracted from a siphon; or from vacuum together with heat—as 
in the case of the cupping glasses attracting fl esh. Paulus Venetus’ conclu-
sion concerning all of these cases is that the attraction exerted to prevent the 
vacuum is intrinsically caused by the natural motion of each body. 
37 Albertus de Saxonia, Quaestiones subtilissimae, lib. 1, quaestio 1, fol. A3, col c. Cf. 
Duhem, Système du Monde, vol. VIII, pp. 158-160.
38 Paulus Venetus, Expositio Pauli Veneti super octo libros physicorum Aristotelis necnon super 
comento (sic) Averois (sic) cum dubiis eiusdem, Venetiis: Gregorium de Gregoriis, 1499, lib. IV, 
Xii, col. d.
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Th is argument raises the same question Albertus de Saxonia’s argument 
prompted: How is this conclusion to be reconciled with the Aristotelian the-
ory the author subscribes to, whereby the simple bodies only have one simple 
motion?39 Paul’s solution is similar to Albert’s and uses the same terms as those 
employed in his explanation of the clepsydra phenomenon. When Aristotle 
says that simple bodies have just one simple motion, he is referring to the 
motion that is primary to the body and that belongs to it by virtue of its spe-
cies. But, apart from this motion, simple bodies can have any other motions 
as well, not as primary motions, but as motions conferred to them by their 
genus. Th erefore, “if we consider  simple bodies as elements of a given spe-
cies, they have only one motion; if, apart from this, they are also considered 
as natural, they have all the motions equally [indiff erenter], naturally, by an 
intrinsic [principle] to suppress the vacuum.”40
It should come as no surprise then, that Paulus Venetus criticizes Aegidius’ 
theory of a celestial power of attraction aimed at preventing a vacuum. He 
understands that Aegidius, in resorting to the celestial power of attraction, 
postulates an extrinsic cause. What Paulus Venetus does not accept is essen-
tially the consequence of postulating an extrinsic cause for avoiding a vacuum: 
that of transforming the motion that seeks to avoid the void into a violent 
motion. In fact, many medieval authors explained the distinction drawn by 
Aristotle between natural and violent motions41 through the contrast between 
an intrinsic and extrinsic principle of motion. From this perspective, natural 
motion is considered the eff ect of an intrinsic principle of the mobile, while 
violent motion is considered the eff ect of an extrinsic principle.42  
To the authors already presented, we must add other medieval authors that 
used diff erent versions of the theory of the two natures to ground their rejec-
tion of the vacuum starting from various experiments. Among them we can 
mention Walter Burley (c.1275-1345), Jean de Jandun ( d. 1328), Pseudo-
Aegidius Romanus, etc.43 In short, at the end of the Middle Ages, the argu-
ments on void that employed the teleological principle of subordination were 
fi rmly established, to the point of becoming a sort of commonplace of natural 
philosophy.
39 Cf. Aristotle, De Caelo, I, 2, 268b-269a.
40 Paulus Venetus, Expositio Pauli Veneti super octo libros physicorum, lib. IV, Xvi.
41 Aristotle, Physica, IV, 8, 215a 1-5; V, 6, 230a 18-230b 20. Th is distinction raised various 
problems of interpretation for the commentators. See Denis Des Chene, Physiologia. Natural 
Philosophy in Late Aristotelian and Cartesian Th ought, Ithaca and London: Cornell University 
Press, 1996, pp. 222-223.
42 For example, Th omas Aquinas, In octo libros physicorum Aristotelis expositio, cura et studio 
M. Maggiòlo, Torino: Marietti , 1954, liber 8, lectio 7, n. 4: “Manifestum est enim quod ea quae 
per violentiam moventur, ab alio moventur, ex ipsa violenti defi nitione. Est enim violentum, ut 
dicitur in III Ethicorum, cuius principium est extra, nil conferente vim passo.” 
43 Cf. Duhem, Système du Monde, vol. VIII, pp. 134-68; Grant, “Medieval Explanations,” 
pp. 329-331 and passim.
 22 Silvia Manzo
3. Th e Reception of the Principle in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries
During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, we fi nd the principle of 
subordination as postulated in arguments on the separate void enjoying a 
remarkable reception with authors from the most varied circles. Let us fi rst 
turn to some of the Aristotelian textbooks most widely disseminated in the 
Protestant universities. Th e textbook by Johannes Magirus (d. 1526) holds 
a conception of the ends of nature similar to those we have been discuss-
ing. It asserts the primacy of the universal end, emphasizing its theological 
implications. Th e ultimate end, according to Magirus, is the exaltation and 
glory of the Creator.44 Meanwhile, Bartholomäus Keckermann (1571-1609) 
in his Systema Physicum, applies this concept specifi cally to the problem of the 
vacuum. He argues that nature would rather break its own laws than permit 
the existence of a void. It would not come as a surprise then that Keckermann 
thinks this violation of the laws of nature can be eff ected through a violent 
motion, like the motion produced by cupping glasses.45 
Other noteworthy cases are found among the Catholic Aristotelian text-
books. Th e Spanish Jesuit Francisco Toledo (1532-1596), a professor at the 
Collegium Romanum whose commentaries on the Physics were widely dissemi-
nated, holds an anti-vacuist position. Toledo acknowledges that a void be-
tween bodies could occur, if the divine omnipotence intervened to this end. 
In the regular course of nature, a vacuum is impossible because it goes against 
the contiguity between bodies, which is the most important principle of the 
order of nature:
Th e contiguity of all bodies to each other is the greatest disposition of nature, 
so, just like a continuous part attracts another continuous part to itself by its 
motion, that which is contiguous attracts another contiguous to itself, when no 
other body can follow it. And this contiguity of bodies is in agreement with the 
nature of the universe and depends on the power of the universal causes which 
was redirected into these inferior bodies. But for their power to be controlled 
through these means, they must come in contact with the power of the higher 
causes through intermediate bodies. But if an intermediary void existed, that 
power of the virtual contact with the higher causes would be interrupted by it.46 
In Toledo, the discussion of the duality between the particular and the uni-
versal natures, between the part and the whole, arrives at a synthesis that com-
bines the diff erent vocabularies we have found at the origins of this distinction, in 
44 Johannes Magirus, Physiologiae Peripateticae libri sex cum commentariis. Accessit Caspari 
Bartholini Malmogii Dani, Enchiridion Metaphysicum, Francofurti: Johannes Berneri, 1619 
(fi rst ed. 1597), lib. 1, cap. 3, theor. 17-20; lib. 1, cap. 3, comment. F, p. 63.
45 De Waard, L‘expérience barométrique, pp. 19-20.
46 Francisco Toledo (Toletus), Commentaria una cum questionibus in octo libros de Physica 
auscultatione, Venetiis: Apud Iuntas, 1573, lib 4, c. 9, quaestio 10, fol. 131 r.
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the works of R. Bacon and Th omas Aquinas. In fact, in explaining why the mo-
tions that avoid a vacuum should be regarded as natural and not violent, Toledo 
tells us that “although they appear not to agree with the particular appetite of the 
things themselves, they do agree with the order of the orb of the universe, and 
that which occurs on account of the whole is more natural than that which occurs 
on account of the part.”47 Th e vocabulary of the universal and the particular (R. 
Bacon) is grafted onto the vocabulary of the whole and the part (Aquinas). 
Th e Jesuit Coimbra Commentaries emphasize both the omnipresence of 
the tendency towards good and the importance of the appetite for self-preser-
vation. Th is appetite is presented within the framework of the ascendancy of 
the common good over the individual one. While the maxim of ascendancy is 
laid down in the context of natural philosophy, with reference to the discus-
sion about the existence of a vacuum, it is made clear that this appetite aff ects 
not just inanimate bodies, but all beings in their diff erent roles: “there is in 
everything a congenital appetite to protect and preserve itself. For example, 
the desire to seek healthy and useful things, and shun the harmful.”48 Th is 
appetite manifests itself in the tendency of the elemental bodies to produce 
bodies like themselves, in the animals’ concern to educate their off spring, in 
the work of men of letters that write books, and in the fact that politicians and 
military men seek public recognition and admiration.
Th e Coimbrans refer to Aquinas when they declare that, although the pri-
vate and common good can have diff erent ends, the common interest prevails 
over the private one.49 Looking for congruities with the Aristotelian doctrine, 
they add that, when Aristotle states in the Nicomachean Ethics that the private 
good is preferable to any other good, we have to take this claim not as oppos-
ing the private good to the public one, but as contrasting it with other private 
goods.50 Th e superiority of the common good also asserts itself whenever there 
is a confl ict between the preservation of the individual and that of the whole: 
“every natural being strenuously attempts to preserve two things: the common 
good of the whole nature and its own particular good. [...] Th e common good 
is the more excellent and divine [...] as with most earnest desire one aspires to 
it.”51  Th is is why nature abhors a vacuum:
Because the void dissolves the preservative power of things and prevents the 
union, so that the sublunary world does not receive the force that spreads 
47 Ibid.
48 Conimbricenses, Commentariorum Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Jesu, in octo Libros 
Physicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae, Coloniae: Zetznerus, 1616 (fi rst ed. 1592), lib. IV, cap. IX, qu. 
I, art. III, col. 79.
49 Conimbricenses, in Phys, lib. IV, cap. IX, qu. I, art. V, col. 84. Cf. Des Chene, Physiolo-
gia, pp. 171-177. 
50 Aristotle, Ethica Nic., VIII, 2, 1155b 21-27. 
51 Conimbricenses, in Phys, lib. IV, cap. IX, qu. I, art. III, col. 80.
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from heaven, since it cannot happen that this force travel through the inter-
stitial vacuum. On which topic one may note that each natural thing duti-
fully strives to preserve two things: the common whole of nature and its own 
particular good. 52
Another Jesuit, Francisco Suárez (1548-1617), also employs the tradi-
tional argument, briefl y alluding to the universal nature, which he identifi es 
with God himself or the divine providence.53 In Disputationes Metaphysicae, 
a work widely distributed in Catholic and Protestant countries alike, Suárez 
examines this question in Disputatio XVIII, when he discusses the transmis-
sion of powers at a distance. He denies the possibility of action at a distance 
occurring in a vacuum. Suárez admits that his thesis cannot be proved by a 
positive experiment, since no one has ever created a vacuum. However, he 
believes it could be proved by “a negative experiment (so to speak) and by the 
providence of the universal nature or rather of its author, who created things 
in such a way and infused them with such a propensity or motion so as to 
absolutely avoid a vacuum, even if they were to leave their natural places for 
it.”54 Th is is a true and absolute necessity in nature, and Suárez justifi es it by 
the same argument that had been advanced by the Coimbrans and by Toledo. 
Appealing to the authority of Aristotle,55 he says that the contiguity of bodies 
is necessary so that the infl uence of heaven can be transmitted to the lower 
bodies: “It seems that this primarily serves the purpose that some might exert 
their actions through others and that distant bodies can participate, through 
intermediaries, in the infl uence of these others, and especially in that of the 
heavenly bodies.”56
Suárez believes that the particular natures or causes are helped and sup-
ported by the celestial natures, when the former are not enough to ensure 
the order of the universe.57 Th is is the sense in which one has to understand 
the essential subordination of the individual natures to the celestial ones. Th e 
teleology of this proposal is perhaps clearer than ever in Suárez’ words: 
Th ere are many motions or actions in these natural things that cannot be 
suffi  ciently accounted for by referring to the particular properties or inclina-
tions of each thing; like when water rises to fi ll the void, a fact that cannot be 
52 Conimbricenses, in Phys., lib. IV, cap. IX, qu. I, art. III, col. 80.
53 Th e same identifi cation of God with the universal agent that guarantees the connection 
between bodies is present in Pseudo-Aegidius Romanus. Cf. Grant, “Medieval Explanations,” 
p. 334 n13.
54 Francisco Suárez, Disputaciones Metafísicas, traducción de Sergio Rábade Romeo, Salva-
dor Caballero Sánchez and Antonio Puigcerver Zanón, Madrid: Gredos, 1961, Disp. XVIII, 
sect. VIII, 14, pp. 230-31.
55 Aristotle, Meteorologica, liber 1, cap. 2.
56 Suárez, Disputaciones Metafísicas, Disp. XVIII, sect. VIII, 14, pp. 230-231.
57 Ibid., Disp. XXII, sect. V, pp. 682-694.
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accounted for by the peculiar nature of water and its own impetus, but only 
through the end which rests in the perfection of the whole universe, which is 
clearly intended by a superior agent.58 
Th e principle of subordination was adopted by several Renaissance authors 
with diff erent philosophical approaches. We fi nd the anti-vacuist argument 
coming from the pen of Giovanni Battista della Porta (1535-1615), who reit-
erates the theory of the two natures.59 On the other hand, in his anti-vacuist 
argument, Girolamo Cardano (1501-1576) appeals to the material continuity 
required by the universal consensus. In his most widely circulated work, De 
subtilitate, he distinguishes three main classes of natural motions. Th e fi rst of 
these is introduced as motus fuga vacui or motus a forma elementi. It occurs 
when matter does not allow for greater rarity and its parts do not allow to 
be separated. Th e example advanced for this motion is that of the bellows, 
one of the favorite examples in the expositions on the vacuum. Experiment 
informs us that hermetically sealed bellows cannot be opened, unless air en-
ters through some tiny opening or they are violently broken.60 In explaining 
the phenomenon, Cardano says that it was not caused by a vacuum, alluding 
to the classic argument according to which a vacuum cannot—since there is 
no such thing—be the cause of anything. Th e cause of the bellows’ motion 
is the “form” of air itself, which is “not capable to tear itself apart or separate 
itself.” Th is is a motion that, although natural, is not particular. In Cardano, 
the relation between universal and particular natures is expressed in terms 
of “particular motion” and “universal consensus.” Th us, bodies give up their 
own motions (their particular natures) to obey the universal consensus (the 
universal nature).61
Although in other respects Julius Caesar Scaliger (1484-1558) opposes 
much of what Cardano argued for in De subtilitate, his position regarding the 
vacuum coincides in some points with the one advanced in that work. Scaliger 
agrees with those who maintain that the vacuum is shunned in the pursuit of 
preservation. Th e appetite of preservation does not seek to preserve the place, 
as that is not an essential attribute of bodies. Nor does it seek the connection 
with other bodies, as the mathematicians have shown that connection and 
contact are possible without any need for a place.62 Moreover, Scaliger adopts 
the theory we have just outlined, of the relation between the part and the 
whole, diff erentiating the tendency to preserve the whole of the universe from 
58 Ibid., Disp. XXIII, sect. X, 10, p. 803.
59 Cf. De Waard, L‘expérience barométrique, pp. 61-62.
60 For the experiments with the bellows, see De Waard, L‘expérience barométrique, p. 17; 
Schmitt, “Experimental Evidence,” pp. 355-357; and Grant, Much Ado about Nothing, pp. 82-83.
61 Hieronymus Cardanus, De subtilitate Libri XXI, nunc demum ab ipso autore recognovit 
atque perfeti, Basileae: per Ludovicum Lucium, 1554, p. 8.
62 Iulius Caesar Scaliger, Exotericarum exercitationum liber XV de subtilitate, ad Hieronymum 
Cardanum, Francofurti: Apud A. Wechelum, 1582, Exc. V, pp. 12-13.
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the tendency to preserve the particular body as part of the universe. Finally, 
there is another point where he is an agreement with Cardano: what bodies 
seek to preserve is their form.63 
Th e Averroist Alessandro Achillini (1463-1512) describes very clearly the 
aspiration to divinity which determines the appetite of things to preserve them-
selves and last forever: “What all things want the most is to be assimilated to the 
divine perfection. [...] All entities want to last forever and resemble God.”64 It 
is in light of this that he agrees with other authors who argue that corruption is 
not the product of the natural beings’ appetite, but an accidental eff ect. Every-
thing pursues the good and the good is the preservation of one’s form: “natural 
agents do not tend to corruption themselves, as much as they become corrupt 
only by accident, but they themselves tend to generation, for the natural agent 
aspires to the good. And the good is the form. Privation is the evil.”65 
In the same vein, Jacopo Zabarella (1533-1589) supports the principle of 
subordination, from a predominantly Aristotelian perspective. Although he 
does not apply the distinction to the question of the vacuum, he does apply it 
in biology, in the same way Albertus Magnus had done centuries before him. 
In a passage from his work De rebus naturalibus, Zabarella states that all those 
actions of animals that do not attend to their own being or self-preservation 
seek the preservation of the species. Generation obeys the universal nature, on 
the one hand, in that it mainly seeks the preservation of the species. On the 
other hand, it also obeys the particular nature, which seeks fi rst and foremost 
the preservation of the individual and only secondarily that of the species. 
Th us, the function of the universal nature is “to establish the ultimate goal 
to which things tend.” By contrast, the objective of the particular nature is, 
fi rst, for the animal to exist and, second, for it to survive to an age suitable for 
generation, so as to permit the preservation of the species.66 
In another passage, this time concerning the nature of mixed bodies, Zaba-
rella provides us with a precise defi nition of “universal nature” as “the order of 
all things and of all causes arranged in a certain order as they depend on a fi rst 
principle, which imposes certain specifi c laws to individuals, which cannot be 
set aside.” Although things do not want to perish, the universal nature decrees 
that they are subject to corruption, in such a way that their corruption has a 
63 Th is view concerning the conservation of the form, seen as a whole in which the parts 
fi nd their purpose, is apparently a Renaissance development of the teleological foundations of 
Aristotle’s biology.  Cf. Allan Gotthelf and James Lennox, Philosophical Issues in Aristotle’s Biol-
ogy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987, p. 200.
64 Alexandrus Achillinus, Opera omnia in unum collecta, Venetiis, Hieronymus Scotus, 
1545, lib. 1, 86v.
65 ib. lib. 1, p. 87v.
66 Jacopo Zabarella, De naturalis scientiae constitut. liber, 98 D-F, in De rebus naturalibus, 
libri XXX, 4th ed., Coloniae: Lazarus Zetznerus, 1602. 
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natural (fi nal) cause and is produced by a natural agent.67 . Th us, generation 
and corruption can be described as “fatal” since fate (fatum) is a “law laid 
down by the universal nature for every thing to be generated and corrupted.” 
Th e particular nature is therefore subject to the law of the universal nature.68
Alongside the anti-vacuist positions we have reviewed, the sixteenth cen-
tury also saw the rise of several voices defending vacuism, some of them by 
refuting arguments that appealed to the universal nature. Th ese voices were 
defending the existence of the separate vacuum, not just of the extra-cosmic 
vacuum that a lot of medieval authors had come to accept as a hypothesis. 
Bernardino Telesio (1509-1588) was one of the fi rst authors to argue against 
anti-vacuism. Th e same experiments the medieval and Renaissance authors 
cited to deny the existence of a vacuum, Telesio interprets in the opposite 
direction. Th us, he refers to the examples of the clepsydra, the bellows, and 
frozen water to show that a vacuum can exist in nature. In defense of this 
position, he criticizes the appeal to universal nature the “Peripatetics” make in 
order to account for the alleged absence of a vacuum. Telesio bases his rejec-
tion of the theory of universal nature, fi rst, on the fact that one cannot see 
how it “comes to do what it is supposed to do in order for a vacuum not to 
occur.” Th is is not to deny matter’s tendency to preservation, as Telesio has no 
doubt that “entities enjoy mutual contact and do not bear to be separated and 
disunited.” However, the preservation of mutual contact can be obtained only 
under certain circumstances, when the forces of matter are suffi  cient both for 
its weight and for its mass. A vacuum is produced when the material forces are 
not enough to prevent it. Telesio illustrates his position by using the example 
of the clepsydra. If the bottom holes of the clepsydra are very small, it is cer-
tain that water cannot descend, according to the appetite of contact between 
bodies. But, if the bottom holes were of a larger diameter, Telesio does not 
doubt that the water would fl ow out, even if that meant that a vacuum was 
produced in the container.69
Although Francis Bacon (1561-1626) pronounced Telesio “the fi rst of the 
moderns,” he was also very critical of various aspects of the latter’s philosophy, 
including his defense of the existence of a void.70  F. Bacon himself did not 
always hold the same opinion with respect to the vacuum. In his early philo-
sophical works, he accepted the existence of some types of vacuum, whereas in 
67 Jacopo Zabarella, De misti generatione et interitu, lib. II, cap. IV, 618 C-E, in De Rebus 
naturalibus, libri XXX.
68 Ibid., 619 E-F.
69 Bernardino Telesio (Telesius), De rerum natura iuxta propria principia libri IX, Neapolis: 
Apud Horatium Salvianum, 1586, lib. 1, cap. xxv, pp. 36-37. Cf. Schmitt, “Experimental 
Evidence,” pp. 560-561.
70 I discuss this theme in detail in Silvia Manzo, “Th e Argumentation on Void in the Sev-
enteenth Century: Th e Case of Francis Bacon,” Th e British Journal for the History of Science 36 
(2003), pp. 26-43.
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his last works, he staunchly denied the possibility of any kind of vacuum. For 
our present topic, it is interesting to note how, in justifying his anti-vacuism, 
he resorted, in his own way, to the theme of the distinction between natures. 
In his classifi cation of motions, F. Bacon allots a class for a motion he usu-
ally refers to as the “motion of connection” (motus nexus, also called ne detur 
vacuum). Bacon holds that, in the case of containers similar to the clepsydra, 
there is a confl ict between two appetites, both of which tend to certain mo-
tions, one to the “motion of gravity” and the other to the “motion of connec-
tion.” Th e confl ict is decided according to a rule of dominance that Bacon es-
tablishes for motions at all levels of nature: “the motion of connection, serving 
the union of the universe, is more powerful than the motion of gravity, which 
serves the union of dense bodies.”71 Like in the case of the Coimbrans, for Ba-
con the primacy of the common good over the private one is a principle that 
applies throughout the universe. Th is principle is expressed in the most gen-
eral axioms of physics, politics and theology, collected by the fi rst philosophy:
‘Whatever is preservative of a greater Form is more powerful in action,’ is a rule in 
physics; for that the connexion of things should not be severed, nor a vacuum (as 
they call it) admitted, tends to preserve the fabric of the universe; whereas the col-
lection of heavy bodies towards the mass of the earth tends to preserve only the 
region of dense bodies; and therefore the fi rst motion overcomes the last. Th e same 
holds in Politics; for whatsoever contributes to preserve the whole state in its own 
nature, has greater power than that which only benefi ts the particular members 
of that state. It holds likewise in Th eology, for, of the theological virtues, charity, 
which is the virtue most communicative of good, excels all the rest.72
Th e idea that the preservation of the whole is the highest good is best 
refl ected in the way the principles that govern nature and those that govern 
politics converge, according to Bacon: 
But they express and expound into themselves the fundamental law of na-
ture, whereby all things subsist and are preserved; which is that every thing in 
nature, although it has its private and particular aff ection and appetite, and 
does follow and pursue the same in small moments, when it is free and deliv-
ered from more general and common respects, yet, nevertheless, when there 
is question or case for sustaining of the more general, they forsake their own 
particularities and proprieties and attend and conspire to uphold the public.73 
71 Francis Bacon, Novum organum, in Th e Works of Francis Bacon, ed. by James Spedding, 
Robert Leslie Ellis and Douglas Denon Heath, 7 vols., London: Longman and Co, 1859-1864; 
repr. Stuttgart/Bad Cannsttat: Friedrich Frommann Verlag-Günther Holzboog, 1989, vol.  I, p. 
349. See the same example in De augmentis scientiarum, in Works I, p. 717.
72 F. Bacon, De augmentis scientiarum, in Works I, pp. 541-542; IV, p. 338.
73 F. Bacon, A Brief Discourse Touching the Happy Union of the Kingdoms of Scotland and 
England, in Th e Letters and Life of Francis Bacon, ed. by James Spedding, 7 vols., London: 
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Th is rule of the common good’s dominance determines the minor ap-
petites, because it seeks the preservation of a form that aff ects a greater por-
tion of the universe (forma amplioris; forma magis communis). Th e example 
F. Bacon gives for the co-presence of the common and the private goods is 
reminiscent of Aegidius Romanus. It is in the magnetic attraction that one can 
see the degree to which the inanimate nature is structured the same way as the 
animate one: “Th erefore we see the iron in particular sympathy moveth to the 
loadstone; but yet if it exceed a certain quantity, it forsaketh the aff ection to 
the loadstone, and like a good patriot moveth to the earth, which is the region 
and country of massy bodies.”74
Th e metaphor of the good citizen and the principle of subordination reap-
pear in similar terms, only to be refuted, shortly afterwards, in the writings of 
Robert Boyle (1627-1691). Beyond his committed promotion of the Baconian 
experimental program, Boyle disagrees with F. Bacon in his interpretation of 
the phenomenon of the vacuum. His research on the properties of air and his 
experiments with the vacuum pump only served to validate his total rejection 
of the ancient horror vacui idea. He considered this idea untenable, not least 
because it was based on meaningless assumptions, like that “a brute and inani-
mate creature” such as water not only had the power to move up, but also knew 
that it had this power and was so generous as to ascend, thus acting against “its 
particular inclination for the general good of the universe, like a noble patriot, 
that sacrifi ces his private interests to the publick ones of his country.”75 
4. Conclusion
Th is survey of the period from the thirteenth to the seventeenth centuries 
shows that the principle of subordination persisted for at least fi ve centuries 
in a signifi cant number of authors. While the vacuum question was at the 
center of important debates and subject to completely opposite approaches, 
the principle of subordination itself was never called into question. Th us, for 
example, when Telesio or Boyle reject the anti-vacuist argument based on the 
principle of subordination, they do not call into question the principle itself, 
only its application to the problem of the vacuum. Beyond all the changes that 
took place from the thirteenth century onwards in society and culture in gen-
eral, and in natural philosophy in particular, it is remarkable that authors with 
diff erent interests and diff erent backgrounds, writing in various styles and 
starting from various questions, appealed to the same teleological principle, 
Longman and Co., 1861-1874, vol. III, p. 90.
74 F. Bacon, Th e Advancement of Learning, in Works III, p. 420; De augmentis scientiarum, 
in Works I, p. 717. 
75 Robert Boyle, Th e Works of the Honourable Robert Boyle, ed. by Th omas Birch, 6 vols., 
London: Rivington, 1772, vol. 2, p. 38. Cf. vol. 1, p. 75.
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according to which nature is understood as a whole whose parts invariably 
defer to it in order to ensure its preservation. 
Th is persistence we have described does not imply that the principle al-
ways appeared in the same way and without any modifi cations. Th e context 
in which the principle was embedded contributes the element of diversity 
which modifi es the core element of continuity running through the stud-
ied cases. Certainly, there are those like Albertus de Saxonia, Paulus Vene-
tus and Bartholomäus Keckermann, whose refl ections on the vacuum were 
fi rmly anchored in the opposition, typical of Aristotelianism, between natural 
and violent motions. Th erefore, their appeal to the teleological principle of the 
two natures was tied to an explanation in terms of the type of motions these 
natures implied. Other authors, such as F. Bacon and the Coimbrans, started 
from a view in which the principle of subordination applies to all aspects of 
reality. Th us the examples involving the vacuum and those involving projectiles 
(Pseudo-Grosseteste), originally from physics, have parallels not only in biology 
(R. Bacon, Zabarella or Albertus Magnus), but also in politics, ethics and theol-
ogy (Aquinas, the Coimbrans and F. Bacon). In the fi eld of physics itself, the 
idea that form is what must be preserved (Cardano, Scaliger, Achillini) is com-
mon currency in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Meanwhile, the con-
nection or identifi cation of the universal nature with a superior celestial agent 
(Pseudo-Grosseteste, Albertus Magnus) or with God himself (Suárez) seem to 
be attempts to cast this teleology as a direct product of an agent that transcends 
either this world in full, or at least the sublunary realm.
Th e role of the universal nature and of equivalent concepts was, at times, 
to permit continuity between bodies so as to ensure the order of nature. Th ose 
who held that, in order to run properly, the sublunary world must be gov-
erned by the supralunary world (Pseudo-Grosseteste, Albertus Magnus, Ae-
gidius Romanus, Toledo, Suárez, the Coimbrans) saw the continuity between 
bodies as a prerequisite. To this, one must add the theories in which the uni-
versal nature was considered responsible for the order of the world in aspects 
specifi cally pertaining to animate beings. Th us, in the fi eld of biology (R. Ba-
con, Zabarella, Albertus Magnus, Achillini), the universal nature is seen as the 
guarantor of the continuity of each species’ life, because it regulates the vital 
cycles. On the other hand, when the principle of subordination is presented as 
the ascendancy of the common good, the universal nature acts as a regulating 
principle not only in physics, but also in politics, ethics and theology (Aqui-
nas, F. Bacon, the Coimbrans).
In F. Bacon’s anti-Aristotelianism, which rejects the sharp distinction be-
tween the supra- and the sublunary worlds, the appeal to a higher transcen-
dent agent is absent. What regulates the actions of animate and inanimate 
beings is the principle of the dominance of the common good, which is in 
nature and governs it. As a preliminary guess, one might say that it is pre-
cisely this emphasis on the principle’s immanent character that represents a 
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signifi cant change from Bacon’s predecessors and from his contemporaries 
that were closer to traditional philosophy. F. Bacon’s natural philosophy estab-
lishes horizontality among the various components of nature, which rules out 
a relation of subordination between the celestial and the terrestrial beings, but 
does not preclude the principle of action of the parts (terrestrial or otherwise) 
from deferring to the whole whose order must be preserved.
Finally, this study may help us refl ect on the nature of the changes that 
took place in the history of philosophy and science in the transition from 
the Middle Ages to the Renaissance and early modernity. Duhem, the great 
pioneer of the history of medieval science, was convinced not only that the 
fourteenth century was the scene of important scientifi c developments, but 
also that medieval science was instrumental in shaping the scientifi c revolu-
tion. Decades later, the works of Alexandre Koyré upheld the opposite view, 
maintaining that it was not possible to establish any continuity between medi-
eval natural philosophy and modern natural philosophy. Edward Grant, who, 
in his early writings published in the 1970s, adhered to Koyré’s position and 
deemed the medieval contribution to modern science not very signifi cant, had 
a change of heart with the passage of time. His latest works accept that the 
scientifi c revolution would not have been possible without certain conditions 
and intellectual changes that took place in the Middle Ages. However, Grant 
does not believe that specifi c medieval theories about nature infl uenced the 
emergence of modern science.76
In line with the historiographical approach of Peter Barker and Roger 
Ariew,77  I believe that the matter of continuity or discontinuity in the his-
torical development of science and philosophy should not be presupposed in 
advance by historians, but should be arrived at as a result of concrete historical 
research. On the other hand, it would be best not to assume that one must 
encounter one of these two alternatives, understood as incompatible and as 
absolute polar opposites. Th is article, focused on the discussions about the 
existence of the vacuum in nature, shows that there is recognizable continuity 
between the great periods covered, which indicates that, contrary to what a 
certain part of the traditional historiography has argued, the transformation 
76 Edward Grant, Th e Foundations of Modern Science in the Middle Ages, their Religious, 
Institutional, and Intellectual Contexts, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, chap. 8. 
Th ese are just some of the most representative proponents of each view. For a more panoramic 
view of the debate around the continuity vs. discontinuity between medieval and modern sci-
ence, see for instance David Lindberg, “Conceptions of the Scientifi c Revolution from Bacon 
to Butterfi eld,” in David Lindberg and Robert Westman (eds.), Reappraisals of the Scientifi c 
Revolution, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990,  pp. 1-26; Bruce Eastwood, “On 
the Continuity of Western Science from the Middle Ages: A.C. Crombie’s Augustine to Galileo,” 
Isis 83 (1984), pp. 84-99.
77 Cf. Peter Barker and Roger Ariew (eds.), Revolution and Continuity. Essays in the History 
and Philosophy of Early Modern Science, Washington: Th e Catholic University of America Press, 
1991, Introduction, pp. 1-19,  n. 1, p. 19.
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of the image of the world engendered at the beginning of modernity did not 
necessarily involve abandoning the teleological reading of natural processes.78 
However, I do not assume a naïve view of historical continuity. I do not claim 
that the continuity I have pointed to is a simple, exact repetition, without any 
modifi cations, of the principle of subordination. Th e nuances that diff erenti-
ate the theories we have examined do not allow us to ignore the diversity of 
the general framework from which they emerged. Th us, the principle of sub-
ordination is recurrent and can be identifi ed along a historical continuum, but 
is not always presented in the same manner or with the same purpose. Where 
there is “continuity,” it is also possible to fi nd innovation and variety as to 
what changes. Where there is a gap, it is not always necessary that all traces of 
the past are completely gone.
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